Unemployed and their Caseworkers: Should they be Friends or Foes? by Stefanie Behncke et al.
 













  Unemployed and their Caseworkers: 
Should they be Friends or Foes  
   
  Stefanie Behncke, Markus Frölich, and  
Michael Lechner 
  




Editor:  Prof. Jörg Baumberger 
University of St. Gallen 
Department of Economics 
Bodanstr. 1 
CH-9000 St. Gallen 
Phone  +41 71 224 22 41 









Department of Economics 
University of St. Gallen 
Bodanstrasse 8 
CH-9000 St. Gallen 
Phone  +41 71 224 23 25 






















Unemployed and their Caseworkers: 
Should they be Friends or Foes?
1 
 





Authors addresses:  Stefanie Behncke  
SIAW-HSG 
Bodanstrasse 8 
9000 St. Gallen  
Tel.   +41 71 224 2304 
Fax  +41 71 224 2298 
Email stefanie.behncke@unisg.ch   
 
Dr. Markus Fröhlich 
SIAW-HSG 
Bodanstrasse 8 
9000 St. Gallen 
Tel.          +41 71 224 2329 
Fax           +41 71 224 1198 
Email         markus.froelich@unisg.ch 
 
Professor Dr. Michael Lechner 
SIAW-HSG 
Bodanstrasse 8 
9000 St. Gallen 
Tel.          +41 71 224 2350 
Fax           +41 71 224 2298 
Email         michael.lechner@unisg.ch 
                                       
1 Markus Frölich is also affiliated with IFAU, Uppsala, and IZA, Bonn. Michael Lechner has further affiliations 
with ZEW, Mannheim, CEPR, London, IZA, Bonn, and PSI, London. We are very grateful in particular to Heidi 
Steiger and Stephan Werner for help with the data and to Stephan Hammer for fruitful cooperation in this 
project. We also thank Martin Grubb and Thomas Ragni as well as seminar participants in Mannheim (ZEW), 
Nürnberg (Federal Employment Agency), St. Gallen (COST meeting), Oslo (EALE), and Munich (German 
Economic Association) for helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own. We are 
grateful to the research fund of the Swiss unemployment insurance system (at the seco) for providing the 
administrative database as well as substantial financial support for this project.  
 
Abstract 
In many countries, caseworkers in a public employment office have the dual roles of 
counselling and monitoring unemployed persons. These roles often conflict with each other 
leading to important caseworker heterogeneity: Some consider providing services to their 
clients and satisfying their demands as their primary task. Others may however pursue their 
strategies even against the will of the unemployed person. They may assign job assignments 
and labour market programmes without consent of the unemployed person. Based on a very 
detailed  linked jobseeker-caseworker dataset, we investigate the effects of caseworkers' 
cooperativeness on the employment probabilities of their clients. Modified statistical 
matching methods reveal that caseworkers who place less emphasis on a cooperative and 
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JEL Classification 
J68, C31 1  Introduction
* 
We use a very informative linked jobseeker-caseworker dataset augmented by detailed information 
on caseworker characteristics in combination with matching estimation to examine a question that is 
important  in  implementing  the  counselling  processes  of  unemployment  insurance  systems.  The 
question is about the impact of different levels of caseworkers' cooperativeness concerning their 
unemployed clients on the future employment chances of their clients. Observing the employment 
outcomes up to 3 years after registration, we find that a caseworker who is more demanding (i.e. 
less co-operative) vis-à-vis the unemployed person achieves higher re-employment probabilities. 
In most countries, caseworkers are assigned the dual role of counselling and monitoring of unem-
ployed persons. These two roles often conflict with each other: On the one hand, caseworkers need 
to establish a trustful and empathetic relationship with their clients for providing effective counsel-
ling. On the other hand, they have to police job search behaviour and initiate and enforce sanctions 
if it falls short of the requirements mandated by the unemployment insurance law. Since the legal 
rules typically leave some leeway to the caseworker on how to weight these two potentially con-
flicting roles, it is not surprising that individual caseworkers weight them differently. Some case-
workers pursue a more dominating and demanding stance vis-à-vis the unemployed, while others 
aim at a more cooperative relationship devoid of conflicts. Caseworkers perform this dual task by 
setting certain rules and initiating certain actions for their clients (e.g. sending clients to specific 
programmes of the active labour market policies or imposing sanctions), in addition to more per-
sonal channels such as counselling style, personal relationships, empathy or sympathy. 
Substantial research interest has been devoted to the question on how to improve the public unem-
ployment system. Various aspects or instruments of the relationship between jobseeker and em-
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ployment office have been considered. The impact of explicit rules and incentives are examined in 
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003), who considered 'optimal' unemployment insurance (UI) systems. 
They examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI via passive labour market 
policy: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare, 
and  find  that  a  system  with  monitoring  and  sanctions  improves  search  incentives.  Pavoni  and 
Violante (2007) and Wunsch (2007) provide a theoretical economic framework to determine the 
'optimal' choice between different passive and active labour market policy instruments. In their 
models, the typical optimal sequence of policies is unmonitored job search, followed by monitored 
job search and social assistance as an absorbing state.  
So far, the role of increased monitoring has been examined in Meyer (1995), Gorter and Kalb 
(1996), and Dolton and O'Neill (1996), who found significant positive effects of monitoring in the 
USA, Netherlands, and the UK, respectively. Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschenes (2000), and 
Bloom, Hill, and Riccio (2003) found no significant effects of increased monitoring in the USA, 
though. The effects of sanctioning as one of the instruments of the employment offices have been 
examined in Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller (2005), who found significant positive effects of 
sanctions for Swiss unemployment recipients. Van den Berg, van der Klaauw, and van Ours (2004) 
found positive effects of sanctions for Dutch welfare recipients, and Abbring, van den Berg and van 
Ours (2005) found positive effects of sanctions on Dutch unemployment benefit recipients. Svarer 
(2007) also finds positive effects of sanctions on the job-finding rate in Denmark. Black, Smith, 
Berger, and Noel (2003), and Graversen and van Ours (2006) find evidence for threat effects of 
employment and training programmes: mandatory assignment to a programme increases job finding 
rates before participation starts, because unemployed want to avoid time-consuming programmes.  
We add to this literature in that we do not consider only the effects of one single instrument (such as 
monitoring or sanctioning) but rather the relationship between caseworkers and their unemployed   3 
clients as a whole.
1 In addition to explicit rules and incentives, the personal relationship between 
caseworker and unemployed could have an important effect on motivation, job search intensity, and 
job acceptance. A more demanding caseworker may use certain instruments more often but the dif-
ferent counselling style in itself can have important effects. These personal or behavioural factors 
had received less attention in the economics literature until recently. 
Principal-agent  theory  suggests  that  caseworkers  could  increase  the  unemployed  person's  job-
finding and job-taking rates through a less cooperative behaviour: Unemployed persons have an 
incentive to avoid costly job search or to wait for better job offers, and caseworkers are required to 
set appropriate incentives through compensation and supervisory schemes.
2 Caseworkers should 
thus demand more job search effort and treat unemployed accordingly. Confirming this line of ar-
gument, several studies found that monitoring and sanctions increase employment probabilities. On 
the other hand, effective counselling by the caseworker may require a trustful atmosphere. An un-
employed person who expects a stiff caseworker will obviously provide distorted information about 
his preferences, needs, skills, aspirations, job search efforts, and the like. In such an atmosphere, 
counselling by caseworkers may be useless as well as any labour market training programmes. In 
addition, recent experimental evidence indicates that individuals may have reciprocal preferences. 
When being treated nicely by the caseworker, they may be more willing to behave nicely (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 2001). Hence, caseworkers might achieve higher employment rates by cooperating with 
their clients instead of potentially punishing them or by ignoring their requests. Caseworkers are 
                                                           
1   Using production frontier analysis Ramirez and Vassiliev (2007) have pointed out that substantial scope for improv-
ing the effectiveness of public employment services in Switzerland seems to exist, see also Ferro-Luzzi et al. (2005) 
and Sheldon (2003). However, those analyses are not directly instructive in pointing out how to improve effective-
ness. 
2   Shavell and Weiss (1979) argue that unemployment insurance lengthens unemployment duration because of its effect 
on job search effort and the reservation wage. However, if caseworkers could monitor job search behaviour, no such   4 
well aware of these two opposing views of the world and their trade-offs, but each caseworker may 
be weighting the importance of these models differently. 
This paper also helps to understand the determinants of exiting unemployment. One strand of the 
literature has estimated the relationship between the unemployed person's characteristics (age, gen-
der,  education,  etc.)  and  the  hazard  rate  for  leaving  unemployment,  e.g.  Machin  and  Manning 
(1999). Another strand of the literature has evaluated how certain instruments such as labour market 
programmes, monitoring or sanctions affect employment.
3 Caseworker characteristics have received 
less attention, though. This analysis is made possible by a unique linked jobseeker-caseworker data-
set with very detailed information on both jobseekers caseworkers. (To the best of our knowledge, 
such data was not available before.) Focusing on the caseworker-client relationship enriches the 
traditional evaluation literature since the imposition of sanctions or assignment of labour market 
programmes could already be considered as an outcome of caseworker's behaviour. 
We use semiparametric matching estimators that have been developed in the statistics literature and 
successfully applied in labour economics since several years.
4 To be more precise, we use statistical 
propensity score matching with an extension to radius matching and incorporating regression-type 
adjustment following ideas by Rubin (1979), Abadie and Imbens (2006), and others. In contrast to a 
conventional duration model analysis, which would focus only on the hazard rate out of unemploy-
ment, we estimate the employment probability at a certain point in time. This thus captures not only 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
problem would exist. Unemployment insurance benefits could be withheld if effort or the reservation wage was un-
satisfactory. 
3   See Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) for a survey of empirical findings of programme effects in the USA and 
Europe, or Martin and Grubb (2001) for a survey of OECD experiences, or Wunsch (2005) for a survey of pro-
gramme effects in Germany. See the previous footnotes for the literature on sanctions and monitoring. 
4   See  e.g.  Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  (1983),  Lechner  (2002),  Black  and  Smith  (2004),  Imbens  (2004),  or  Ham  and 
LaLonde (2005).   5 
the exits from unemployment to employment but includes also re-entry in unemployment, an im-
portant aspect from a public policy perspective. 
Our estimation results indicate a positive effect of reduced cooperativeness on employment prob-
abilities of about 2 percentage points. Hence, pursuing a more demanding stance vis-à-vis unem-
ployed persons increases employment probabilities in the short and in the medium term (up to 3 
years after the beginning of unemployment) by a non-negligible amount. This increased employ-
ment is not obtained at the cost of reduced stability of jobs. The effects on stable employment are 
also positive and of similar magnitude. The sensitivity of these results is explored by examining 
several alternative specifications, in particular concerning the choice of the control variables and 
various definitions of the treatment variable. The results are rather stable, although often less pre-
cisely estimated. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: The following section discusses the unemployment insur-
ance system in Switzerland. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 the statistical methodology. 
Sections 5 and 6 give the main estimation results, and Section 7 concludes. Several appendices pro-
vide additional details. 
2  The Swiss labour market and the role of caseworkers 
2.1  Overview 
Until the recession of the early 1990s, unemployment was extremely low in Switzerland, a small 
country with 26 different administrative regions, called cantons. With the recession, the unemploy-
ment rate rose rapidly to 5% (see figure below) and triggered a comprehensive revision of the fed-
eral unemployment insurance act in 1996/1997. The about 3000 municipal unemployment offices 
were consolidated to a smaller number of regional employment offices. Compared to the previous 
municipal offices, which were largely concerned with administering unemployment benefits, these   6 
regional offices, of which there were about one hundred operating in 2003, aimed at providing pro-
fessional services with respect to counselling, placement, activation, and training. A large number 
of caseworkers were hired and further trained for these purposes. 





















































































































Note: Monthly unemployment rate, January 1990 – August 2007, Source: Swiss National Bank Monatshefte. 
 
This was financed by the unemployment insurance. In 2003, the period we consider in our study, 
both employers and employees were obliged to contribute a share of 2,5% of the salary. Benefits 
amounted to 70-80% of the former salary depending on age, dependents and income. By July 2003 
the rules for benefit entitlement were tightened for individuals younger than 56: the minimum con-
tribution time was raised from 6 to 12 months and the maximum benefit entitlement period was 
reduced from 24 to 18,5 months.  
2.2  Caseworkers' autonomy 
Whereas the federal State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (seco) has a clear vision about the aims 
the  employment  offices  and  caseworkers  should  pursue,  with  a  strong  focus  on  rapid  re-
employment, the caseworkers generally enjoy substantial freedom in how they attempt to achieve 
these goals and how they treat their clients. This freedom and heterogeneity arises from two factors.   7 
First, the 26 cantons in Switzerland generally enjoy a large autonomy in their implementation of the 
unemployment insurance law. Although none of them would violate clear legal provisions, such as 
imposing stronger benefit sanctions than legally permitted, they have substantial leeway on many 
other margins. The operational costs of the employment offices and their staff, as well as the costs 
of labour market programmes and benefits payments are fully financed by the federal unemploy-
ment insurance funds.
5 Therefore, it is tempting and without serious cost consequences for cantons 
to pursue their own goals and philosophies to a limited extent. For example, one goal of such a local 
strategy might be to avoid large numbers of people drawing on welfare benefits, which are financed 
by  the  cantons  (and  their  municipalities).
6  A  demanding  stance  vis-à-vis  the  unemployed  may 
quickly reduce the number of registered unemployed, but it may also lead to poor job matches, in-
stable jobs, and repeated unemployment, which could eventually lead to more people drawing on 
welfare as they are no longer entitled to unemployment benefits. Being more lenient and trying to 
satisfy the unemployed person's wishes may on the other hand lead to better job matches, and thus 
more sustained employment, less job separation, and less turnover in the medium term, or at least 
reduce the number of persons in need of welfare benefits.  
The second source of caseworkers' autonomy arises within the cantons and particularly within the 
employment offices. Many of the employment office managers consider it important to grant sub-
stantial autonomy to caseworkers such that they can develop their own personal counselling style 
and react to the needs of their clients without being bound by many bureaucratic rules. This is also 
                                                           
5   In addition to the unemployment benefits, this includes the costs of maintaining and operating the employment of-
fices as well as active labour market programmes. Technically, the cantons bear the costs of the employment offices 
and active labour market measures, but they are refunded by the federal unemployment insurance funds up to a fixed 
ceiling that depends on the number of unemployed in the canton. 
6   Rules for social assistance are set at the cantonal level. They vary widely with regard to cost distribution between 
cantons and municipalities, as well as with regard to form and level of benefits and organisation.    8 
confirmed by the caseworkers, who consider this freedom to be a very important aspect for their job 
satisfaction.
7 
2.3  The relationship between caseworker and unemployed persons 
The relationship between the caseworker and his clients is characterized by the two roles of the 
caseworker: to help the unemployed person in searching and finding appropriate employment and to 
monitor whether the unemployed person searches thoroughly enough and is indeed willing to take 
up any job offer with acceptable pay and within acceptable commuting distance. Some caseworkers 
put more emphasis on their role as a counsellor and aim for a trustful relationship, whereas other 
caseworkers may see their policing role to be more important and may be more dominating and 
demanding vis-à-vis the unemployed person. 
To analyse the effects of the caseworker-client relationship a written questionnaire was adminis-
tered to all caseworkers and office managers in Switzerland about their aims, attitudes, behaviour, 
etc.
8 A key question asked the caseworker how important he/she considers the cooperation with the 
unemployed person: 
Table 1: Survey question on cooperativeness of the caseworker 
How important do you consider the cooperation with the jobseeker, regarding placements in jobs, and as-
signment of active labour market programmes? 
￿ 1   Cooperation is very important; the wishes of the unemployed person should be satisfied. 
￿ 2   Cooperation is important, but placements in jobs and active labour market programmes should 
   sometimes be assigned or declined in spite of the unemployed person's wishes. 
￿ 3   Cooperation is less important; I should assign placements in jobs and active labour market  
  programmes independent of the wishes of the unemployed person 
Note:   English translation of the respective question in the questionnaire. Questionnaires were in German, French, and Italian. 
                                                           
7   See e.g. the French and German versions of the interview protocols in the appendix to Frölich et al. (2007). 
8   This data was collected as part of a large evaluation project for the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and 
is described in more detail later. Qualitative face-to-face interviews with the management and caseworkers were con-
ducted beforehand in 12 employment offices. Subsequently, all managers and caseworkers were surveyed with an 
extensive written questionnaire. For details, see Frölich et al. (2007).   9 
52% of the caseworkers chose option one, 39% of caseworkers chose option 2, and 9% of case-
workers chose option three. Only very few caseworkers did not respond to this question. In the 
main empirical analysis, we will compare those caseworkers who chose option 1 (cooperative) with 
those who chose option 2 or 3 (not so cooperative). In additional analyses, we will compare option 
1 versus 3, leaving out those who answered with option 2. 
When comparing these answers with the responses to other items of the questionnaire we observe 
that the less cooperative caseworkers consider control and sanctions, job assignments, and employ-
ment programmes as instruments that are more important. Counselling meetings and interim jobs 
(temporary wage subsidies) being less important. They also responded that they tended to assign 
active labour market programmes to apply pressure and to control their clients' availability for jobs 
and to give less emphasis to the wishes of the jobseeker. 
The variation in the cooperativeness across caseworkers will be exploited to estimate the impact of 
cooperativeness on the employment prospects of the unemployed. The cooperativeness of the case-
worker may be driven by several factors, which we have to take into account as these various char-
acteristics may themselves have an independent effect on the employment chances of their unem-
ployed. First, many characteristics of the caseworker himself may affect his attitude and behaviour. 
Important factors could be age, gender, education, and, in particular, experience in the form of ten-
ure and participation in caseworker training programmes. Previous own experience of unemploy-
ment may also strongly affect the way the caseworker treats his unemployed clients. The case-
worker's attitude may also depend a lot on the average characteristics of his clients. For example, a 
caseworker who is attending mainly unskilled foreigners with a poor employment history may be 
treating them differently than a caseworker who deals mainly with highly skilled unemployed who 
experienced unemployment for the first time in their life. Hence, characteristics such as gender, age, 
nationality, qualification, and past unemployment experience of the clients are likely to affect case-  10
worker's behaviour. Furthermore, characteristics of the local labour market will also be relevant. If 
the local unemployment rate is low, a caseworker may be less lenient with unemployed than other-
wise. As a last aspect, we will also consider certain aspects of the organisation of the employment 
office, where the caseworker is employed at, as these may also determine the caseworker's behav-
iour. The data needed to control for those characteristics is presented in the next section. 
3  Data 
3.1  Data and sample selection 
The population for the microeconometric analysis are all individuals who registered as unemployed 
anytime during the year 2003, and their outcomes are followed up until the end of December 2006. 
For these individuals very detailed individual information is available from the databases of the 
unemployment insurance system (AVAM/ASAL) and the social security records (AHV). These 
data sources contain socio-economic characteristics including nationality and type of work permit, 
qualification, education, language skills (mother tongue, proficiency of foreign languages), experi-
ence, profession, position, and industry of last job, occupation and industry of desired job, an em-
ployability rating by the caseworker, etc. The data also contain detailed information on registration 
and de-registration of unemployment, benefit payments and sanctions, participation in ALMP, and 
the employment histories since January 1990 with monthly information on earnings and employ-
ment status (employed, unemployed, non-employed, self-employed). 
The databases contain the population of all jobseekers including individuals employed but search-
ing for a job, unemployed without benefit entitlement, and unemployed entitled to benefits. In the 
econometric analysis, we will focus on the last group since the first two groups are largely immune 
to potential threats and sanctions of the caseworker.   11
In total, 239,004 persons registered as new jobseekers during the year 2003. Notice that we consider 
only the first registration in 2003 for each person and subsume any further registrations within the 
outcome variables, i.e. the analysis is person based and not spell based. As mentioned above, we 
exclude jobseekers without benefit claim and individuals who applied for or claim disability insur-
ance. Furthermore, we exclude foreigners without permanent or yearly work permit, as they are not 
entitled to most of the services of the unemployment insurance. For some unemployed their case-
worker is undefined, which may happen if an unemployed person de-registers before being assigned 
to a caseworker. We also exclude a few employment offices that are not comparable to other offices 
in 2003. In our main analysis we focus on the prime-age group (24 to 55 years old), with a final 
sample size of 100,222. See Appendix A for further details. 
3.2  Definition of outcomes and treatment variables  
Each newly registered unemployed person in 2003 was linked to his first caseworker via the user 
database of the unemployment insurance system (AVAM). This database contains basic informa-
tion about each caseworker, such as age and gender. To complement this information we conducted 
an extensive survey of all caseworkers. A written questionnaire was sent to all caseworkers and 
employment office managers who were employed at an employment office between 2001 and 2003 
and were still active in December 2004, i.e. at the time the questionnaire was sent. The question-
naire contained questions about aims, strategies, processes, and organisation of the employment 
office and the caseworkers. 1560 caseworkers and employment office managers returned the ques-
tionnaire, which is equivalent to a rate of return of 84% of the active caseworkers.
9  
The question most relevant to our analysis was shown in Table 1. Of the 1560 individuals who re-
turned the questionnaire, 159 office managers who did not counsel jobseekers during the year 2003 
                                                           
9   Obviously, the questionnaire could not be conducted anonymously since we needed to link the answers of each case-
worker with their clients. However, caseworkers were guaranteed full confidentiality.   12
were not asked that question. 16 caseworkers did not answer to this question. 723 answered with 
option 1, 540 answered with option 2, and 122 answered with option 3. In our main specification, 
we consider those who answered with option 1 as cooperative caseworkers and those who chose 
option 2 or 3 as less cooperative, which we also sometimes label as "non-cooperative" caseworkers. 
Although the cooperation attitude of a caseworker may clearly vary between his clients, we expect 
that a cooperative caseworker be on average more cooperative to all his clients than a less coopera-
tive caseworker is.  
Combining options 2 and 3 to define non-cooperation is based on the presumption that both show a 
deviation from the full cooperation attitude that more than half of all the caseworkers display. In our 
robustness analysis, we will also consider other definitions. In particular, we compare option 1 di-
rectly with option 3. 
We seek to estimate the effect of the cooperation attitude on the employment chances of the unem-
ployed person. The unit of measurement for the outcome variable is thus the unemployed person. 
We consider an individual as employed in month t if she has de-registered with the employment 
office because of having found an occupation and has not yet re-registered. Thus, we solely rely on 
information from the employment office database to determine the employment situation. The em-
ployment status is measured with some error since a de-registered individual could have left the 
active labour force or could have found an occupation after de-registering without letting the em-
ployment office know. Nevertheless, a validation study for earlier years where employment data 
was available from two sources (the unemployment database and the social security data) shows a 
rather high reliability of our outcome variable, see Frölich et al. (2007). 
To analyse the evolvement of the impacts of the caseworker's attitude on the employment probabili-
ties, the employment status, 
0 , i t Y τ + , is measured until the end of 2006, relative to the time of first 
registration, t0. Hence, for individuals who registered in January 2003, their employment status is   13
followed up for 47 months, whereas only 36 months are observed for those registering in December 
2003. Observing employment for at least three years allows not only the estimation of short-term 
effects, but also them medium-term effects of cooperation. 
Figure 2 shows the employment rate for our sample relative to the time of registration at the em-
ployment office. The black line represents the employment rates for unemployed who were coun-
selled by a less cooperative caseworker, whereas the grey line refers to cooperative caseworkers. 
The employment rates for both groups of unemployed are very similar. About 1% de-register one 
month after registering because of having found an occupation. About 7% have found a new job 
after two months and 44% have found employment one year after becoming unemployed. 
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Note:   Average employment rates are for prime age individuals in main sample. The grey (black) line shows averages for the 
51923 (48299) unemployed who were counselled by a cooperative (less cooperative) caseworker. 
The employment rates in Figure 2, however, do not account for the fact that the unemployed coun-
selled by cooperative and less cooperative caseworkers are quite distinct. Table 2 shows that these 
two groups of unemployed differ in many characteristics. Foreigners, less qualified unemployed, 
and unemployed with a poor employability rating are more likely to be counselled by less coopera-
tive  caseworkers.  In  this  sense,  the  less  cooperative  caseworkers  face  the  more  difficult  cases,   14
which may be the reason for the small differences observed in Figure 2. A larger effect may be 
masked by these differences in client's characteristics.   15
Table 2: Selected characteristics by cooperation attitude of the caseworker 








Characteristics of the unemployed person          
N (number of unemployed)  51923  39310  8989 
Female  0.45  0.44  0.42 
Age  36.5  36.6  36.6 
Swiss  0.63  0.61  0.56 
Foreigner with permanent work permit  0.24  0.25  0.29 
Foreigner with yearly work permit  0.13  0.14  0.16 
Qualification: unskilled  0.21  0.23  0.28 
Qualification: semiskilled  0.16  0.16  0.14 
Qualification: skilled without degree  0.04  0.04  0.05 
Qualification: skilled with degree  0.58  0.57  0.53 
Employability rating: low  0.13  0.14  0.17 
Employability rating: medium  0.75  0.74  0.72 
Employability rating: high  0.12  0.12  0.11 
          
Characteristics of the caseworker          
Number of case workers  723  540  122 
Female  0.42  0.41  0.40 
Age  45.2  43.7  42.8 
Tenure in employment office in years  5.75  6.01  5.54 
Own experience of unemployment   0.65  0.61  0.62 
Education: vocational training  0.30  0.34  0.41 
Education: above vocational training  0.46  0.41  0.40 
Education: tertiary track (university or polytechnic)  0.24  0.25  0.19 
Degree in vocational training for caseworkers  0.20  0.26  0.26 
 
Allocation of unemployed to caseworkers  a) 
At random  0.22  0.23  0.22 
By alphabet  0.03  0.04  0.07 
By number of clients  0.42  0.44  0.44 
By industry  0.52  0.57  0.56 
By occupation  0.52  0.62  0.57 
By age  0.03  0.04  0.01 
By employability  0.07  0.06  0.07 
By region  0.12  0.11  0.17 
Other  0.08  0.08  0.04 
       
Local labour market characteristics          
German speaking employment office  0.69  0.71  0.60 
French speaking employment office  0.26  0.22  0.19 
Italian speaking employment office  0.05  0.07  0.20 
Cantonal unemployment rate  3.70  3.75  3.79 
Unemployment rate in industry  4.83  4.93  5.11 
Note:   The entries in the table are shares in %, means, or number of observations, by subgroup. 
a) Multiple answers to this question were permitted. Hence, the means do not sum up to 1.   16
Cooperative and less cooperative caseworkers also differ in their own characteristics, which may be 
related to their efficacy in counselling and placing unemployed. Table 2 shows, more of the non-
cooperative caseworkers have participated in the vocational training programme for caseworkers, 
whereas more of the cooperative caseworkers have a university degree. There are also differences in 
the organisation of the employment offices, with the non-cooperative caseworkers being more often 
specialised towards counselling unemployed of a certain industry or occupational group. Lastly, 
there are also differences in the local labour market situations the caseworkers face, e.g. a some-
what higher local unemployment rate for the non-cooperative caseworkers. We also observe clear 
differences by language region. Unemployed who live in the Italian-speaking region are more often 
confronted with less cooperative caseworkers compared to their counterparts in the German and 
French-speaking regions. The language region will therefore be an important control variable, and 
we will use interaction terms with language regions in our later regressions throughout. 
4  Methodology 
As pointed out in the last section, clear differences exist between the unemployed attended by a 
cooperative or a less cooperative caseworker, which we need to control for. We will seek to find a 
parsimonious specification that captures the most important factors without introducing too much 
noise due to irrelevant variables. First, the semiparametric econometric methodology is described. 
4.1   Conditional independence assumption as identification strategy  
Consider an individual i who registers as unemployed at time t0 at the nearest regional employment 
office. This person is then assigned to a caseworker of that office.
10 The caseworker is of a particu-
lar type with respect to his willingness to cooperate with his client. Let Di denote the attitude of the 
                                                           
10  This may take a few weeks because the secretariat may require all relevant documents before assigning a counselling 
meeting. They may also send the unemployed person first to a one-day information workshop.   17
caseworker who is counselling individual i. In most of the analyses, we will define Di as binary, 
where Di = 1 represents a non- or less-cooperative caseworker whereas Di = 0 represents a coopera-
tive caseworker. 
We are interested in the impact of a cooperative caseworker on the subsequent employment pros-
pects of this unemployed person, which we measure by the employment status, 
0 , i t Y τ + , in the month 
τ after registration. In particular, we would like to compare the employment status with the potential 
employment status if the same unemployed person was counselled by a caseworker with a different 
attitude. We base our analysis on the prototypical model of the statistical evaluation literature with a 




i t Y τ +   (1) 
be the potential outcome at some time τ after unemployment registration at time t0, if the case-
worker was of type d. In other words, 
0
0
, i t Y τ +  is the employment outcome that would have been ob-
served had person i been counselled by a cooperative caseworker, whereas 
0
1
, i t Y τ +  is the employment 
outcome that would have been observed had person i been counselled by a non-cooperative case-
worker. To simplify the notation in the following we will always consider the outcomes relative to 
the time of registration and treat the time of registration t0  as an additional covariate of person i. We 
will therefore drop the subscripts and denote the potential outcomes simply as 
0
i Y  and 
1
i Y . The av-
erage treatment effect for a person who has been counselled by a non-cooperative or by a coopera-
tive caseworker is 
1 0 [ | 1] E Y Y D − =     (ATET), 
1 0 [ | 0] E Y Y D − =     (ATEN).    18
We will often refer to these parameters as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) and 
the average treatment effect on the non-treated (ATEN), respectively. The following discussion 
focuses on the ATET, with obvious modifications for the ATEN. Identification of these treatment ef-
fects requires further assumptions.  
For being able to estimate the expected potential outcomes for different values of d, we need to ob-
serve variation in Di that is exogenous with respect to the outcome variable. The observed type of 
the  caseworker  Di  might  be  related  to  many  factors  that  also  have  an  impact  on  employment 
chances, such that in general 
  [ ] [ | ]
d d E Y E Y D d ≠ = .  (2) 
However if we were to condition on all variables X that determined the type of the caseworker and 
the potential employment chances of the unemployed person, conditional on X the potential out-
comes would be identified: 
  [ | ] [ | , ]
d d E Y X x E Y X x D d x χ = = = = ∀ ∈ ,  (3) 
where  ( ) Supp X χ⊆ .
11 This assumption is referred to as the conditional independence assumption (CIA) in 
the following. It is also called unconfoundedness in the statistical literature (e.g. Rubin, 1974). We assume 
the CIA to hold for every value of x that lies in the support of X in the D=1 and the D=0 population, i.e. 
( | 1) ( | 0) Supp X D Supp X D χ= = ∩ = . This common support restriction is discussed further be-
low. 
The most crucial aspect of the identification strategy thus relies on being able to observe all con-
founding variables X. To do so, the very detailed linked caseworker-client dataset, described above, 
is essential together with an understanding of the determinants of the cooperation attitude of the 
caseworker. The cooperativeness Di of the caseworker depends on three processes: First, which 
                                                           
11  Supp(A) denotes the support of the random variable A.   19
types of caseworkers are hired, second, how caseworkers are allocated to the unemployed, and third 
how their attitude develops after having been trained and gained experience on the job. Since atti-
tudes of caseworkers could be related to their general skills of finding jobs for their clients, we in-
clude caseworker characteristics such as their age, gender, education, work experience, and experi-
ence of own unemployment as covariates. We are also able to control for the allocation process of 
unemployed to caseworkers since we know from the questionnaire according to which criterion 
(occupation, alphabet, age, employability, and the like) allocation took place. A further aspect is 
that caseworkers not only differ in their personalities, but they also react to the types of unemployed 
they counsel and the labour market environment they face. If vacancies are scarce and rapid re-
employment appears difficult, caseworkers may be less demanding than in a more favourable envi-
ronment. Similarly, a caseworker who counsels mainly individuals with a low employability rating 
may react differently than a caseworker responsible, e.g., mainly for youth. Therefore, we will in-
clude in the analysis also a large number of covariates on the unemployed person's employment 
history, the local labour market, etc.
12  
4.2  Semiparametric matching estimation 
The  estimator  used  is  a  matching  estimator  as  implemented  in  Lechner,  Miquel,  and  Wunsch 
(2006). The advantage of matching estimators is that they are essentially nonparametric and that 
they allow for arbitrary individual effect heterogeneity.
13 By the conditional independence assump-
tion, the average treatment effect is identified as 
                                                           
12  The available information is much richer than usually available in studies that rely on the conditional independence 
assumption (e.g. Heckman and Smith, 1999; Brodaty, Crépon and Fougère, 2001; Larsson, 2003; Dorsett, 2006). 
13  See Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), for matching with a binary treatment, and Imbens (2000), Lechner 
(2001), and Gerfin and Lechner (2002) for multiple treatments. Imbens (2004) provides an excellent survey of the 
recent advances in this field.   20
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where the first term can be estimated by the sample mean in the D=1 population and the second 
term by 









where  0 ˆ ( ) m x  is a nonparametric estimator of  [ | , 0] E Y X x D = = , e.g. a first-nearest-neighbour es-
timator. As we search for each individual of the D=1 population for the nearest neighbour in the 
D=0 population, this is usually referred to as a “matching” estimator, which matches observations 
from the one population to the other population. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that 
instead of matching on the high-dimensional vector X, consistent estimates are also obtained by 
matching on the one-dimensional propensity score,  ( ) Pr( 1| ) p x D X x = = = , or by matching on 
p(X) and a subset of X that is suspected to be highly correlated with the outcome variable as well as 
with D. Such combinations, which they also refer to as balancing scores, can help to ensure that a 
misspecification of the functional form of the propensity score has only a minor impact. We there-
fore match on the propensity score and a number of additional covariates, where the propensity 
score is given a larger weight in the Mahalanobis distance calculation. (The weight is five times as 
large as for any of the additional covariates.) The small sample properties of matching estimators 
have been well explored and appeared to be quite robust in different practical applications (e.g. 
Larsson, 2003; Gerfin, Lechner, and Steiger, 2005). Moreover, it was subjected to several Monte 
Carlo studies (e.g. Lechner, 2002) investigating small sample problems and sensitivity issues.   21
In this paper we use an extension of conventional matching estimation, similar to Lechner, Miquel, 
and Wunsch (2006), which extends the first-nearest neighbour propensity score matching estimator 
in several directions: First, as mentioned above, matching does not only proceed with respect to the 
propensity score but also incorporates additionally some other covariates. Second, instead of using 
first-nearest neighbour matching, all neighbours within a pre-specified radius are used.
14 Third, the 
matching quality is increased by exploiting the fact that appropriately weighted regressions that use 
the sampling weights from matching have the so-called double robustness property. This property 
implies that the estimator remains consistent if the matching step is based on a correctly specified 
selection model or the regression model is correctly specified (e.g. Rubin, 1979; Joffe, Ten Have, 
Feldman, and Kimmel, 2004). Moreover, this procedure should increase precision and may reduce 
small sample as well as asymptotic bias of matching estimators, see Abadie and Imbens (2006),
15 
and thus increase robustness of the estimator in this dimension as well.  
The motivation for radius matching is the possibility of efficiency gains without the risk of incur-
ring too much additional bias. The matching algorithm in Gerfin and Lechner (2002) used the first 
nearest control observation for each treated. However, when there are other comparison observa-
tions that are similar to the matched comparison observation, there are straightforward efficiency 
gains (without paying a high price in terms of additional bias) by considering these additional 'very 
close' neighbours and forming an 'averaged matched comparison' observation. Of course, there are 
many ways to do this in practice (and we note the similarity to the idea of kernel matching). Here, 
our basic consideration is to be much more cautious with respect to additional bias that with respect 
to additional variance, because the variance of the estimator is visible after the estimation, whereas 
the bias generally is not. To be conservative, we consider only observations that have a distance to 
                                                           
14  This is thus similar to a kernel estimator with a uniform kernel function. 
15  The results of Abadie and Imbens (2006) do not apply directly to propensity score matching, but since we also match 
on additional variables there are some similarities with the estimators they consider.   22
'their' treated observation of no more than 90% (denoted by R in the following) of the worst match 
that we had obtained by one-to-one matching (after enforcing common support; R=0 is the case of 
one-to-one matching; R corresponds to a bandwidth choice in kernel weighting). To be even more 
conservative, we weight the observations proportionally to their distance from the treated (corre-
sponding to a triangular kernel). The results are not very sensitive to the exact way the weighting is 
implemented. When R is reduced the means change little, but the estimated variances increase 
slightly. 
In addition to incorporating all control observations within a certain radius, we also reduce bias by a 
weighted regression. Here we note that Abadie and Imbens (2006) have shown that the usual one-
to-K matching estimators, where K is a fixed number, may exhibit an asymptotic bias, because 
matches are not exact. Our weighted radius matching estimator does not necessary imply a fixed K 
and is thus probably less subject to this problem. Nevertheless, we follow their proposal and im-
plement a weighted regression based bias removal procedure on top of the matching. The regression 
is done in the comparison sample only. Outcomes are predicted for the attributes observed in treated 
and control samples. Specifically, the outcome variable is regressed on the propensity score and the 
additional variables with weights coming from the matching step (see Imbens, 2004). The differ-
ence between the mean of the predicted outcomes using the observed X of the treated and the 
weighted X of the comparison observations gives an estimate of the bias (see Table B.1 for the ex-
act implementation). Without the theoretical justification given by Abadie and Imbens (2006), a 
somewhat similar procedure has been used by Rubin (1979) and Lechner (2000). 
We calculate standard errors as in Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006) conditional on the weights 
for the comparison observations, because in Monte Carlo simulations they showed (e.g. Lechner, 
2002) good performance in finite samples (their generalization to non-integer weights as used here 
is trivial). A difference to their implementation is that we have to take into account that the treat-  23
ment variable is measured at the level of the caseworker such that unemployed persons counselled 
by the same caseworker are unlikely to be independent observations. We account for this by com-
puting standard errors clustered at the caseworker level. Details are given in Appendix B. 
The different steps of the estimator are described in Table B.1 in the appendix. In the first step, a 
probit model is used to estimate the propensity score. Step 2 ensures that we estimate only effects in 
the region of common support. For observations of the D=1 sample with propensity score p(x) very 
close to one we would not be able to find a corresponding observation in the D=0 sample with 
characteristics leading to similar values of p(x). However, it will be seen in the following section 
that the common support is very large, and that the loss of observations due is negligible. 
5  Analysis of the determinants of cooperativeness 
5.1  Estimation of the propensity score 
The first step of the empirical analysis consists in examining the determinants of cooperativeness. 
This is done by regressing the cooperativeness of the caseworker on several of his own characteris-
tics and on characteristics of his clients, the local labour market, and the employment office. Since 
these estimates also serve as estimates of the propensity score for the subsequent impact analysis, a 
probit regression on the level of the unemployed person is used, with standard errors clustered at the 
level of the caseworker. 
To examine the robustness of our results, we will consider four different sets of control variables X. 
For our main specification (denoted as Xset 1 with 65 regressors), we include a large number of 
characteristics of the caseworker, the unemployed, the local labour market, and the allocation proc-
ess within the employment office. 
Table 3 shows the estimation results for the probit model for all the regressors that are included in 
the main specification (Xset 1 with 46 regressors) and indicates those variables that are part of a   24
more parsimonious specification denoted as Xset 4 (see below). As mentioned before, the dependent 
variable is defined as being equal to one if the caseworker is less cooperative (option 2 or 3), and 
zero otherwise (option 1). 
A first observation is that many of the coefficients are insignificant (the standard errors take the 
clustering at the caseworker level into account). This implies that caseworkers' attitudes and behav-
iour are more like a personal characteristic of the caseworker instead of merely being an adaptation 
to the external environment. The finding that many variables are insignificant cautions against a 
model with too many X variables as they might simply be adding noise to the propensity score 
matching estimator. We further observe that caseworkers who face many unskilled unemployed or 
who work in offices that internally specialize by occupation tend to be less cooperative, i.e. more 
demanding. The latter may be because specialization by occupation will lead to a better knowledge 
of the employment situation and vacancies in the particular industry. Another observation from Ta-
ble 3 is that many of the interaction terms with the language region are significant. This may be 
particularly related to the language in which the written questionnaire was conducted since the 
translations from German to French and Italian may not have been able to pick up all the nuances of 
language. We therefore retain all these interaction terms as control variables as they are capturing 
important differences between the language regions of Switzerland. 
Some goodness-of-fit statistics of the probit estimates of the propensity score (Efron's R
2 is 0.06) 
indicate some overall descriptive power with a substantial amount of randomness remaining.   25
Table 3: Probit estimates for prime age population (age 24-55, Xset 1) 
Binary dependent variable: being a less cooperative caseworker  
N = 100222    coefficient  std error  in Xset 4 
Constant    -0.24  0.36  ∋ 
French speaking employment office  *  1.39  0.73  ∋ 
Italian speaking employment office  ***  4.75  1.28  ∋ 
Allocation of unemployed to caseworkers (reference: at random) 
By industry    0.14  0.10   
          x French speaking region    -0.06  0.20   
          x Italian speaking region    -0.45  0.36   
By occupation  **  0.24  0.10  ∋ 
          x French speaking region    0.16  0.21   
          x Italian speaking region    -0.03  0.33   
By age    0.12  0.22   
By employability    -0.09  0.17   
By region    0.06  0.13   
Other    -0.05  0.15   
Characteristics of the caseworker 
Age    -0.01  0.01  ∋ 
            x French  speaking region  *  -0.02  0.01  ∋ 
           x Italian speaking region  ***  -0.06  0.02  ∋ 
Female    -0.04  0.10  ∋ 
           x French speaking region    0.07  0.20   
           x Italian speaking region    0.02  0.35   
Experience in employment office (tenure in years)    0.02  0.02  ∋ 
           x French speaking region    -0.03  0.03   
           x Italian speaking region    -0.07  0.05   
Own experience of unemployment    -0.04  0.10   
          x French speaking region    -0.15  0.21   
          x Italian speaking region    0.03  0.38   
Indicator for missing caseworker characteristics    -0.10  0.25   
Education: above vocational training  *  -0.20  0.11  ∋ 
          x French speaking region    0.35  0.25   
          x Italian speaking region    -0.39  0.41   
Education: tertiary track (university or polytechnic)    -0.20  0.14   
          x French speaking region    0.32  0.27  ∋ 
          x Italian speaking region    -0.35  0.48   
Special vocational training of caseworker    0.09  0.12  ∋ 
          x French speaking region    0.29  0.36   
          x Italian speaking region    0.42  0.35   
Table 3 to be continued.   26
Table 3 continued 
    Coefficient  std error  in Xset 4 
Characteristics of the unemployed person 
Female    -0.04  0.03  ∋ 
          x French speaking region    -0.10  0.07   
          x Italian speaking region    0.03  0.08   
Mother tongue other than German, French, Italian    -0.03  0.04  ∋ 
          x French speaking region  *  0.10  0.06   
          x Italian speaking region    0.05  0.07   
Qualification: unskilled  **  0.10  0.04  ∋ 
          x French speaking region    -0.13  0.08   
          x Italian speaking region    -0.04  0.09   
Qualification: semiskilled    0.04  0.05  ∋ 
          x French speaking region    0.00  0.08   
          x Italian speaking region    -0.07  0.17   
Qualification: skilled without degree    0.02  0.05  ∋ 
          x French speaking region  **  0.19  0.09   
          x Italian speaking region  *  -0.28  0.17   
Number of unemployment spells in last two years    0.01  0.01   
          x French speaking region    -0.01  0.02   
          x Italian speaking region  **  0.05  0.02   
Fraction of time employed in last years    0.00  0.03   
          x French speaking region  **  -0.13  0.06   
          x Italian speaking region    0.03  0.09   
Employability low    0.02  0.11   
          x French speaking region    0.15  0.17   
          x Italian speaking region    0.15  0.20   
Employability medium    0.00  0.10   
          x French speaking region    0.02  0.14   
          x Italian speaking region    0.04  0.19   
Local labour market characteristics 
Unemployment rate in canton    0.06  0.06   
          x French speaking region    -0.18  0.12   
          x Italian speaking region  **  -0.27  0.14   
Note:  Standard errors are clustered at the caseworker level. Most variables are interacted with French and Italian language 
region. (German is the reference language region.) The last column indicates variables included in Xset 4 with ∋. 
A crucial aspect of our identification strategy is the conditional independence assumption and thus 
the selection of the set of control variables. In the main specification, Xset 1, we included a large 
number of caseworker and jobseeker characteristics as well as some indicators of the local labour 
market and of the employment office, which we deemed important after several interviews with 
caseworkers and employment office managers. A concern might be that Xset 1 contained too few 
covariates  to  make  the  conditional  independence  assumption  plausible.  Furthermore,  additional 
variables that are related to the outcome variable could increase precision. On the other hand, in-  27
cluding too many variables also runs the risk of including endogenous control variables (i.e. those 
already been affected by the treatment variable) and/or reducing the common support region. They 
may also introduce more noise into the estimation of the propensity score. 
In Xset 2 (= 232 regressors) we added a large number of additional covariates. The additional vari-
ables of the unemployed person are age, civil status, children, and earnings in the last job. Further-
more, there are three dummies for education, three dummies for foreign language knowledge, and 
two dummies for the types of foreigners' work permit. To approximate the unemployed person's 
labour market history, it contains variables capturing the duration of unemployment in the last two 
years, the average wage in last ten years, the total number of employment spells in last ten years, 
the number of employment spells in last five years, an indicator of having been out of labour force 
in last five years, the fraction of time being employed and unemployed in last ten years, and a 
dummy for having a zero contribution time to the unemployment insurance. Furthermore, it con-
tains 16 occupation dummies, six industry dummies, and a dummy for looking for a part-time job. 
With regard to local labour market characteristics, additional variables are municipality size, and 
the cantonal unemployment rate. All these variables are interacted with the French and Italian lan-
guage regions. The pension data also indicate the first month of contribution (since 1990), if ever 
contributed. We also include this variable together with interaction terms with being young/old, and 
foreigner/Swiss. These interaction terms roughly pick up in which year a foreigner migrated to 
Switzerland. 
Most of these variables turned out to be insignificant in the estimation of the propensity score. De-
spite of being insignificant, they still affect the calculation of the propensity score and can thus in-
troduce a lot of noise into the matching estimator. By sequentially deleting insignificant variables in 
the probit model, we generated another Xset 3 (= 94 regressors), in an attempt to reduce noise due 
to insignificant variables. In a general to specific approach, we eliminated covariates whose F-test   28
did not suggest any explanatory power at the 5% level. (One should note that this sequential statisti-
cal variable selection is subject to the pre-test problem such that the size of these repeated tests is 
not exactly 5%. It should rather be considered as an algorithm for selecting the probably most im-
portant variables.) However, we retained all variables of Xset 1 here, even if insignificant. Hence, 
Xset 1 is a strict subset of Xset 3. Further eliminating sequentially all variables with insignificant F-
test leads us to Xset 4 with 46 regressors, which is our most parsimonious specification. 
Table 4 shows various goodness-of-fit statistics of the probit regression for these different sets of X 
variables. The two parsimonious sets Xset 1 (obtained by deliberate choice) and Xset 4 (obtained by 
statistical variable choice) appear to be hardly worse than the two most complex specifications. 
Comparing Xset 2 with Xset 4, adding almost 200 regressors increases Efron's R
2 by less than 2 
percentage points and reduces the number of wrong predictions by less than 800 from more than 
40,000. The additional variables thus mainly introduce noise. 
Table 4: Goodness of fit measures for different Xsets for prime age population (age 24-55) 
Regressors  Number of covariates  Log-Likelihood  Efron's R2  NWP  SSR  WSSR 
Xset 1  65  -66303  0.058  41496  23560.19  100167.38 
Xset 2  232  -65408  0.074  40097  23167.07  100098.15 
Xset 3  94  -65807  0.067  41031  23346.20  100183.13 
Xset 4  46  -66478  0.056  40832  23626.93  100745.01 
Note:  The number of observations for each Xset is 100222. Efron's R2 (Efron, 1978) is a measure for residual variation. NWP is 
the number of wrong predictions, SSR is the sum of squared residuals, and WSSR is the sum of weighted squared residu-
als. 
5.2  Common support 
The nonparametric identification strategy relies on estimating the expected counterfactual outcome 
0 [ | ] E Y X  for every D=1 observation. This is possible only if for every value of X that is observed 
in the D=1 population also at least one individual with very similar values of X can be found in the 
D=0 population. For values of X where  Pr( 1| ) D X =  is equal to one this is impossible by defini-  29
tion, and it is very difficult do find comparison observations if Pr( 1| ) D X =  is very large. Figure 3 
shows histograms of the estimated propensity scores for the D=1 and D=0 subsamples.  
Figure 3: Distribution and common support of the propensity score 
 
Note: Left graph histogram of the estimated propensity scores in the D=0 sample. Right graph histogram of the estimated propensity 
scores in the D=1 sample. Propensity score with Xset 1. 
Partly due to availability of a very large sample, the region of common support appears to be very 
large as well: Even very large values of the propensity score are observed in the D=0 sample and 
also very small values are observed in the D=1 sample. Observations that appear to be outside of 
the common support are deleted for the matching estimator. For estimating ATET, all D=1 observa-
tions with a propensity score larger than the largest propensity score among all D=0 observations 
are deleted. For estimating ATEN, all D=0 observations with a propensity score smaller than the 
smallest propensity score among all D=1 observations are deleted. This leads to a loss of 312 
treated observations (= 0.003%) for estimating ATET in our main specification with Xset 1. When 
estimating ATEN we lose 57 control observations (= 0.0006 %).  
5.3  Matching quality 
An advantage of matching compared to conventional regression is that one can model the propen-
sity score before examining the outcome variable Y. Hence, the propensity score model can be re-
specified until a reasonable fit is obtained without having the researchers' decisions being affected 
by the resulting estimates of the treatment effects. In this sense, this approach is immune to the re-  30
specification and pre-testing problem of conventional regression. In addition, the region of common 
support of the X regressors can also be examined before the outcome variable Y is incorporated. As 
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), matching on the propensity score leads to a balancing 
of the covariates X in the D=1 and D=0 population. Hence, after matching treated and control, the 
joint  distribution  of  X  and  thereby  the  marginal  distributions  of  X  should  be  identical  in  both 
matched subsamples. Thus, a simple way to validate the specification is to test for equality of 
means in the two subsamples. However, since we use a more complex estimation procedure than 
simple matching involving radius matching and regression, a more appropriate balancing test is to 
the estimate the effect of the treatment on the covariates. If the model is correctly specified, this 
effect must be zero asymptotically and should not be significantly different from zero in finite sam-
ples.  
For both groups, Table 5 shows the estimated means, their difference, and t-stats for the hypothesis 
that their means are equal. We find that the matching quality with respect to almost all covariates is 
very good. The only exception is the number of unemployment spells in the past two years: the 
weighting procedure over-adjusts for this variable by raising the mean in the comparison group 
from 0.56 to 0.68. In one of our later specifications, we therefore include this variable as an addi-
tional covariate on which matching is conducted.    31
Table 5: Matching quality Xset 1, prime age population (age 24-55) 








t-value for test 
that difference 
is zero 
Observations (after imposition of common support)  51923  47987     
French speaking employment office  0.21  0.21  0.00  0.00 
Italian speaking employment office  0.09  0.09  0.00  0.00 
Allocation of unemployed to caseworkers (reference: at random) 
By industry  0.57  0.57  0.00  -0.08 
          x French speaking region  0.09  0.08  0.00  0.02 
          x Italian speaking region  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.01 
By occupation  0.60  0.61  0.01  0.36 
          x French speaking region  0.16  0.16  0.00  0.03 
          x Italian speaking region  0.06  0.06  0.00  0.01 
By age  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.12 
By employability  0.06  0.06  0.00  0.23 
By region  0.11  0.12  0.01  0.44 
Other  0.08  0.07  0.00  -0.17 
Characteristics of the caseworker 
Age  43.46  43.63  0.17  0.22 
           x French speaking region  9.25  9.30  0.05  0.04 
           x Italian speaking region  3.71  3.75  0.04  0.05 
Female  0.42  0.41  -0.01  -0.37 
           x French speaking region  0.08  0.08  0.00  0.00 
           x Italian speaking region  0.04  0.03  -0.01  -0.88 
Tenure in employment office (in years)  5.98  5.91  -0.07  -0.29 
           x French speaking region  1.35  1.34  -0.02  -0.09 
           x Italian speaking region  0.67  0.65  -0.02  -0.16 
Own experience of unemployment  0.61  0.61  0.00  0.01 
          x French speaking region  0.14  0.14  0.00  0.05 
          x Italian speaking region  0.05  0.05  0.01  0.65 
Indicator for missing caseworker characteristics  0.05  0.04  0.00  -0.06 
Education: above vocational training  0.43  0.41  -0.02  -0.52 
          x French speaking region  0.09  0.09  0.00  0.02 
          x Italian speaking region  0.04  0.03  -0.01  0.01 
Education: tertiary track (university or polytechnic)  0.23  0.24  0.01  0.44 
          x French speaking region  0.08  0.09  0.00  0.02 
          x Italian speaking region  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Special vocational training of caseworker  0.26  0.25  -0.01  -0.30 
          x French speaking region  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.01 
          x Italian speaking region  0.06  0.05  -0.01  0.01 
Table 5 to be continued.   32









t-value for test 
that difference 
is zero 
Characteristics of the unemployed person 
Female  0.44  0.43  0.00  -0.25 
          x French speaking region  0.09  0.09  0.00  -0.03 
          x Italian speaking region  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.36 
Mother tongue other than German, French, Italian  0.34  0.32  -0.02  -1.17 
          x French speaking region  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
          x Italian speaking region  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Qualification: unskilled  0.26  0.26  0.26  0.26 
          x French speaking region  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 
          x Italian speaking region  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Qualification: semiskilled  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16 
          x French speaking region  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
          x Italian speaking region  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Qualification: skilled without degree  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 
          x French speaking region  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
          x Italian speaking region  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Number of unemployment spells in last two years  0.68  0.59  -0.09  -2.34 
          x French speaking region  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16 
          x Italian speaking region  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09 
Fraction of time employed in last years  0.78  0.78  0.78  0.78 
          x French speaking region  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16 
          x Italian speaking region  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Employability low  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16 
          x French speaking region  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
          x Italian speaking region  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Employability medium  0.72  0.72  0.72  0.72 
          x French speaking region  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16 
          x Italian speaking region  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 
Local labour market characteristics 
Unemployment rate in canton  3.76  3.75  0.00  -0.06 
          x French speaking region  0.88  0.89  0.00  0.02 
          x Italian speaking region  0.38  0.38  0.00  -0.05 
Note: Matching quality for estimation of ATET based on full estimator and after imposition of common support.  
6  Estimated treatment effects 
Section 6.1 gives the main empirical results of the propensity score matching. To examine the ro-
bustness of our results in Section 6.2, we consider four different sets of control variables X, differ-
ent outcome variables, as well as different definitions of the treatment variable D. For each of these   33
different combinations, we re-estimated the propensity score and applied the common support re-
strictions.  
6.1  Impact of a less cooperative caseworker 
The following figures show the matching estimates when the propensity score is estimated with 
Xset 1 and treatment is defined as cooperation not very important versus very important. That is, D 
is defined as one if the caseworker selected option 2 or option 3, and is defined as zero if the case-
worker selected option 1 (see Table 1). In this specification, we isolate those caseworkers who place 
very much emphasis on cooperation versus all the others.  
Figure 4: Impact of having a less cooperative caseworker on employment in %-points 
 
Note:  Average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) on employment, in percentage points. Prime age unemployed (24 to 55 
years). Abscissa: Month after registration of unemployment. Ordinate: Treatment effect on employment in %-points. Dots 
(triangles) indicate significance at the 5% (10%) level. The dashed line represents the pointwise 95% confidence interval. 
Figure 4 gives the estimates for the outcome variable employment for the subsequent 36 months 
after registration. (Triangles indicate point-wise significance at the 10% level, dots at the 5% level.) 
These results indicate that having a less cooperative caseworker increases the employment probabil-
ity by about 2%-points. The effect sets in about five months after registration and is relatively stable 
until month 36. From month 24 onwards, it is significant only at the 10% level, though.   34
An increase in employment probability by 2%-points is a non-negligible effect, given that it only 
requires a change in the caseworkers' attitudes and behaviour towards their clients. At the same 
time, it is also likely to lead to additional cost savings for the unemployment insurance system since 
more demanding caseworkers may also often impose more sanctions in the form of suspension of 
benefits. Unfortunately, reliable data about potential costs of such a policy shift are not available. 
Figure 5: Impact of having a less cooperative caseworker on stable employment 
Figure 5.1: Six months stability 
 
Month after registration 
Figure 5.2: Twelve months stability 
  
Month after registration 
Note:  Average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) on stable employment, in %-points. In left graph, employment is only con-
sidered as stable if the employment spell has a duration of at least 6 months. In right graph, a duration of at least 12 
months is required. Prime age unemployed (24 to 55 years). Abscissa: Month after registration of unemployment. Ordinate: 
Treatment effect on employment. Dots (triangles) indicate significance at the 5% (10%) level. Dashed line represents 
pointwise 95% confidence interval. 
We also examined the average treatment effects separately for four subgroups: qualified, unquali-
fied, older than 55 years, and younger than 24 years. Most of these results, however, turned out to 
be insignificant, mainly due to the smaller sample size. (This was already expected from Figure 4 
where statistical precision was at the margin of detecting a significant effect.) However, estimates 
from other specifications (available on request from the authors) suggest that the qualified, the un-
qualified, and the older unemployed tend to benefit from having a less cooperative caseworker, 
while the effects for the young are always insignificant.  
A general concern with tougher caseworkers is that they might push jobseekers into precarious or 
unstable jobs, which due to the poor match quality might lead to higher separation rates soon after.   35
To examine the stability of jobs we define an individual as being in stable employment in a given 
month if the employment spell is of at least six months duration. Alternatively, we require at least 
12 months duration. Figure 5 gives the treatment effects on stable employment (analogously to Fig-
ure 4), which are positive throughout and only slightly smaller than in Figure 4. Although the statis-
tical  precision  is  insufficient  to  draw  very  strong  conclusions,  it  does  not  appear  that  non-
cooperativeness of the caseworkers would lead to unstable jobs. 
6.2  Sensitivity analysis  
The previous section showed a positive impact of non-cooperativeness of the caseworker on em-
ployment  outcomes.  Albeit  being  statistically  significantly  different  from  zero,  the  confidence 
bands were nevertheless rather wide. In this section, we examine alternative specifications, which 
all point towards a positive impact of non-cooperativeness, although with different degrees of statis-
tical confidence. 
Table 6 shows the estimation results for various alternative specifications. For conciseness, we do 
not show the entire graphs but display the effects only for 6, 12, 18, and 30 months after registra-
tion. The first three rows refer to alternative definitions of employment and correspond to Figures 4 
and 5. They show that the positive impact does not seem to have been arisen at the cost of instabil-
ity of jobs. The magnitude of the effects tends to decrease when we look at stable employment but 
these differences are not significant. The following rows show the results for various subgroups, 
where the results are mostly positive but very imprecise throughout. 
The subsequent rows examine alternative specifications of the estimator and of the regressor set. 
First, we reduce the radius from 0.9 to 0.1 in the propensity score matching estimator. This is simi-
lar to a reduction of the number of neighbours in k-nearest neighbour matching. Coefficients and 
standard errors are not much affected.    36
As an alternative specification, we exclude the regressor 'employability rating of the unemployed', 
which might potentially be endogenous as it is a subjective assessment made by the caseworker. For 
instance, more demanding caseworkers might consider the same type of client as easier to place 
than the more lenient caseworkers might. The results do not change substantially. Second, we add 
the number of clients that caseworkers report to counsel on average to Xset 1, because one may 
want to control for caseworker's workload if more (or less) cooperative caseworkers are more suc-
cessful in placing clients and hence more clients are assigned to them, which might negatively af-
fect their efficiency. Again, the results are hardly affected. Third, we include a dummy for register-
ing as unemployed in the second semester of 2003, since rules for benefit entitlement were tight-
ened in July 2003. Although it has no significant impact on cooperation behaviour, it reduces stan-
dard errors of employment effects by increasing estimation efficiency. Finally, we include the num-
ber of unemployment spells in the past two years as an additional covariate on which to match ex-
actly, because the matching quality was imperfect in Table 5 with respect to this variable. The esti-
mated effects increase for month 6, but slightly decrease for the later months and become less sig-
nificant. 
As discussed above, the choice of control variables is an important aspect for the credibility of the 
conditional independence assumption. Table 6 shows estimates of propensity score matching with 
Xsets 2, 3, and 4, respectively, which all show positive effects but with different degrees of preci-
sion. It seems that the two very large regressor sets 2 and 3, with many insignificant variables, lead 
to noisy estimates, whereas the results with Xset 4, where the insignificant variables have been 
purged, are much more precise. Hence, including too many control variables that are not related to 
the treatment variable can introduce substantial noise into propensity score matching.   37
As a further robustness check, we examined the logit estimator as a parametric alternative to pro-
pensity score matching. The effects remain positive but smaller compared to the matching esti-
mates. This could be due to the functional form assumption imposed. 
Finally, we estimate the ATEN to complement the estimates of the ATET. The effects remain posi-
tive but much smaller and clearly insignificant. A possible interpretation of this finding is that those 
caseworkers who decided or happened to be more demanding were right in doing so, whereas the 
gains from being more demanding are smaller or even zero for those caseworkers who decided 
against this strategy. This is what we would expect if caseworkers adapt to their environment. This 
also explains the previously mentioned small effects of the parametric logit estimator because the 
logit model permits only very limited effect heterogeneity and, more or less, measures some kind of 
average between ATET and ATEN. 
In some further analysis, we also consider alternative definitions of the treatment variable. First, we 
discard caseworkers of the intermediate type and only consider an attitude as being less cooperative 
if the caseworker has explicitly chosen option 3, see Table 1. (In other words, we eliminate all 
caseworkers who chose option 2.) In our main specification, estimates are still positive, but less 
precise due to the smaller sample size. When using the large Xset 2, estimates remain positive but 
less precise. The estimates of the parametric logit model are now similar to the matching estimates. 
Hence, all these estimates remain positive, but tend to decrease over time. The results for ATEN are 
partly negative, on the other hand, although not statistically significantly so. We therefore restrict 
ourselves to interpreting the ATET estimates as overall positive, whereas we cannot say much about 
ATEN.   38
Table 6: The impact of non-cooperativeness on employment, robustness analysis 
    Effect at month after registration 
  Obs.  Month 6  Month 12  Month 18  Month 30 
    Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff  t-Stat 
Non-cooperativeness (option 2 and 3) versus Cooperativeness (option 1) 
Alternative definitions of the outcome variables (Pscore matching with Xset 1, age 24-55) 
    Employment  100222  0.021  2.360  0.018  1.955  0.019  1.917  0.017  1.725 
    Six-months stable employment  100222  0.020  2.316  0.018  1.908  0.019  1.959  0.017  1.785 
    Twelve-months stable employment  100222  0.012  1.614  0.017  1.825  0.016  1.656  0.015  1.532 
Effects on employment for subgroups (Pscore matching with Xset 1, age 24-55) 
Qualified, age 24-55  61191  0.007  0.669  0.008  0.710  0.011  0.994  0.007  0.637 
Unqualified, age 24-55  39031  0.017  1.384  0.007  0.552  0.003  0.229  0.000  -0.033 
Older than 55 years  8580  -0.010  -0.626  0.012  0.690  -0.002  -0.115  0.009  0.437 
Younger than 24 years  28980  -0.006  -0.408  0.005  0.310  0.016  1.091  0.009  0.615 
Alternative specifications (age 24-55) 
PSM with radius 0.1 (Xset 1)  100222  0.022  2.333  0.021  2.128  0.020  1.978  0.018  1.819 
PSM without employability (Xset 1)  100222  0.018  2.047  0.020  2.247  0.016  1.658  0.016  1.614 
PSM with number of clients (Xset 1)  100222  0.020  2.319  0.018  1.944  0.022  2.271  0.014  1.475 
PSM with dummy for 2nd semester 
(Xset 1)  100222  0.023  2.557  0.021  2.224  0.025  2.466  0.022  2.280 
PSM exact on number of unemploy-
ment spells (Xset1) 
100222  0.023  2.611  0.016  1.784  0.018  1.922  0.014  1.514 
Pscore matching (Xset 2)  100222  0.011  1.229  0.001  0.151  0.003  0.325  0.001  0.059 
Pscore matching (Xset 3)  100222  0.010  1.137  0.001  0.083  0.004  0.368  -0.001  -0.056 
Pscore matching (Xset 4)  100222  0.032  3.474  0.023  2.508  0.026  2.696  0.020  1.996 
Logit estimates (Xset 1)  100222  0.008  1.251  0.005  1.098  0.002  0.388  -0.002  -0.322 
ATEN using PSM (Xset 1)  100222  0.002  0.028  0.002  0.209  0.008  0.813  0.016  1.680 
Non-cooperativeness (option 3) versus Cooperativeness (option 1), eliminating caseworkers with option 2 
Pscore matching (Xset 1, age 24-55)  60912  0.036  1.852  0.001  0.044  0.010  0.507  0.011  0.530 
Qualified Age 24-55  37346  0.028  1.226  0.015  0.670  0.024  1.058  0.014  0.623 
Unqualified Age 24-55  23566  0.056  2.171  0.003  0.124  0.021  0.755  0.011  0.397 
Old (> 55 years)  5201  0.003  0.096  0.001  0.042  0.016  0.413  0.008  0.195 
Young (< 24 years)  18059  -0.017  -0.670  0.009  0.342  -0.003  -0.114  -0.007  -0.270 
Pscore matching (Xset 2, age 24-55)  60912  0.032  1.534  0.004  0.232  0.009  0.438  0.011  0.530 
Logit estimates (Xset 1, age 24-55)  60912  0.028  2.583  0.008  1.182  0.012  1.290  0.010  1.010 
ATEN using PSM (Xset 1, age 24-55)  60912  -0.038  -1.529  -0.012  -0.609  0.003  0.129  0.004  0.197 
Intermediate cooperativeness (option 2) versus no or full cooperativeness (option 1 or 3) 
Pscore matching (Xset 1, age 24-55)  100222  0.010  1.159  0.009  0.971  0.009  0.873  0.004  0.442 
Note:  Standard errors are clustered at the caseworker level. Pscore matching and PSM are abbreviations for propensity score 
matching. 
In the last row of Table 6, we tested for possible non-linearities in the treatment variable. One could 
imagine that a caseworker with intermediate cooperation behaviour might perform better compared 
to a caseworker with very low or high cooperativeness. Therefore, as a final check we define D=1 if 
the caseworker chose option 2 and D=0 if the caseworker chose option 1 or 3. The estimates are 
close to zero and insignificant, thereby not confirming this hypothesis.   39
7  Conclusions 
In most countries, caseworkers have substantial autonomy in the extent to which they cooperate 
with their clients. Some place more emphasis on counselling, whereas others also consider monitor-
ing of job search as a very important part of their work. Using large and informative administrative 
data on unemployed persons merged with data on caseworkers and their employment offices, ob-
tained from a detailed questionnaire, we investigate which attitude towards unemployed is more 
successful for their subsequent employment chances. These data allow us to control for potential 
selection bias by semiparametric matching estimators and to account for treatment effect heteroge-
neity. Estimates are obtained up to the first three years after unemployment registration. 
More than half of the caseworkers responded that they considered cooperation with unemployed as 
very important and that the wishes of the unemployed are of key importance for their decisions. 
However, the estimates suggest that the employment probabilities of those unemployed persons 
who were counselled by less cooperative caseworkers were higher because of their less cooperative 
attitude. Such unemployed persons had about 2 percentage point higher employment probabilities 
during the first three years after registration than similar unemployed persons who were counselled 
by (somewhat) less demanding caseworkers. The most plausible explanation for our finding is that 
caseworkers indeed influence their clients' behaviour to search for jobs and accept job offers. In an 
extensive sensitivity analysis, almost all results confirmed the sign of the effect, but in several 
cases, the effect was insignificant.   40
A  Data Appendix 
The population for the microeconometric analysis are all individuals who registered as unemployed 
anytime during the year 2003 at one of the 103 employment offices under study. In total 239004 
persons registered as new jobseekers during the year 2003. Notice that we consider only the first 
registration in 2003 for each person and subsume any further registrations within the outcome vari-
ables, i.e. the analysis is person based and not spell based.  
We restrict our analysis to the 103 regional employment offices that were independently operating 
agencies responsible for a specific geographic area.
16 We do not include the canton Geneva in our 
study since in this canton the employment offices are functionally specialized according to profes-
sions and employability of the jobseekers, which is in striking contrast to all other cantons, which 
largely  follow  a  geographic  structuring.  We  further  exclude  five  employment  offices  from  the 
analysis: three offices that were newly established, split or re-organized during the year 2003, one 
employment office which specialized on the difficult cases in Solothurn, and the tiny employment 
office in Appenzell-Innerrhoden, which did not participate in the survey. 
After excluding those offices, 219540 persons remain who registered in one of the 103 offices. For 
215251 persons the first caseworker was well defined, whereas for the other 4289 no caseworker 
was (yet) assigned. The reason for this is that it may often take several weeks until the first counsel-
ling meeting with a caseworker takes place, e.g. after having participated in a one-day course that 
explains the duties and rights of an unemployed person. In total, 1891 different caseworkers were 
identified in the data. 
                                                           
16  These employment offices had their own staff, a chief officer, and some flexibility in implementing the federal and 
cantonal policies. Some employment offices operate a number of smaller branches e.g. in remote areas, or separate 
between short- and longer-term unemployed. These employment offices usually swap staff between these branches 
and pursue a common strategy. Thus, we consider them as a single entity.   41
We exclude foreigners without yearly or permanent work permit, as they are not fully entitled to all 
services of the employment services. We also exclude individuals on disability or applying for it, 
and for the main analyses restrict the sample to the prime-age population. Finally, we lose about 
25% of observations whose caseworker had either not responded to the questionnaire in general or 
to the cooperativeness question in particular. Comparing the samples before and after dropping 
these observations, we do not find any differences neither in their characteristics, X, nor in their 
observed outcomes, Y. 
Table A.1: Sample selection criteria for empirical analysis 
  Number of individuals 
  deleted  remaining 
Population: all new jobseekers during the year 2003    239,004 
Exclude Geneva and five other employment offices  -19'464  219,540 
Exclude jobseekers not (yet) assigned to a caseworker  -4'289  215,251 
Exclude foreigners without yearly or permanent work permit  -5'399  209,852 
Exclude jobseekers without unemployment benefit claim  -18'434  191,418 
Exclude jobseekers who applied for or claim disability insurance  -3'163  188,255 
Restrict to prime-age population (24 to 55 years old)  -51'649  136,606 
Exclude unemployed whose caseworker did not respond to the questionnaire  -31'469  105,137 
Exclude unemployed whose caseworker did not respond to the cooperativeness question  -4'915  100,222 
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B  Further details on the estimator 
B.1   Matching protocol 
Table B.1: A matching protocol for the estimation of ATET 
Step 1  Estimate a probit model to obtain the choice probabilities:  ˆ Pr( 1| ) i i p D X X = = =  
Step 2  Restrict sample to common support: Delete all D=1 observations with  ˆi p  larger than the largest estimated pro-
pensity score among the D=0 observations. 
 
Step 3  Estimate the counterfactual expectation of the outcome variable 
0 [ | 1] E Y D =  
 
Standard propensity score matching step (binary treatment) 
a-1) Choose one observation from the D = 1  subsample and delete it from that pool. 
b-1) Find an observation from the D = 0  subsample that is as close as possible to the one chosen in step a-1) in 
terms of  ˆ( ), P x x     ɶ , with respect to the Mahalanobis distance. Do not remove that observation, so that 
it can be used again.  
c-1) Repeat a-1) and b-1) until no participant in D = 1 is left. 
 
Exploit thick support of X to increase efficiency (radius matching step) 
d-1) Compute the maximum distance (δ) obtained for any comparison between treated and matched comparison 
observations. 
a-2) Repeat a-1). 
b-2) Repeat b-1). If possible, find other observations of the D = 0 subsample that are at least as close as R x  δ 
to the one chosen in step a-2); R is fixed to 90% in this application but different values are examined in 
the sensitivity analysis. Do not remove these observations, so that they can be used again. Compute 
weights for all chosen comparisons observations such that these weights are proportional to their dis-
tance (calculated in b-1). Normalise the weights such that they add to one. 
c-2) Repeat a-2) and b-2) until no participant in D = 1 is left. 
d-2) For every D=0 observation, add the weights obtained in b-2). 
 
Exploit double robustness property to adjust small mismatches by regression 
e) Using the weights  ( ) i w x  obtained in d-2), run a weighted linear regression of the outcome variable on the 
variables used to define the distance (and an intercept).  
f-1) Predict the potential outcome 
0( ) i y x  of every observation in D = 0  and D = 1  using the coefficients of this 
regression: 
0 ˆ ( ) i y x .  




1 ˆ ˆ 1( 1) ( ) 1( 0) ( ) ( )
N N
i i i i i
i i
D y x D w x y x
N = =
= − = ∑ ∑ . 
g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in d-2), compute a weighted mean of the outcome variables 
in D = 0. Subtract the bias from this estimate. 
 
Final estimate 
h) Compute the treatment effect by subtracting the weighted mean of the outcomes in the comparison group (D = 
0)  from the mean in the treatment group (D = 1). 
Note:  The table refers to the estimation of ATET. The modifications for ATEN are obvious.  x ɶ  includes the two dummy variables 
French speaking and Italian speaking employment office.  x ɶ  is included to ensure a high match quality with respect to 
these critical variables.   43
B.2  Standard errors for clustered matching 
Lechner (2001) suggested an estimator of the asymptotic standard errors for ATET conditional on 
the estimated weights. Since the treatment variable  {0,1} D∈  is measured at the level of the case-
worker but the outcome variable is measured at the level of the jobseeker, for the computation of 
the standard errors we have to take into account that the outcomes across the jobseekers counselled 
by the same caseworker may be correlated. The calculation of the clustered standard errors is de-
scribed in the following. 







Y D l w y
=
= = ∑  









= = ∑ . 
To introduce the cluster structure we can re-write the matching estimator using a double sum 
1 1
ˆ 1( )1( )
J N
l l
i i i i
j i
Y D l C j w y
= =
= = = ∑ ∑ , 
where i indexes the unemployed persons and j =1,…,J indexes the J caseworkers. The variable 
{1,.., } i C J ∈  indicates the caseworker who is in charge of the unemployed i. The number of clients 
of caseworker j in the D=l group and weighted by 
l
i w  is thus given by 
1





N D l C j w
=
= = = ∑ . 
We can compute the variance allowing that the outcomes across unemployed persons counselled by 
the same caseworker are dependent, but assume that observations across caseworkers are independ-
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Hence, the variance is obtained by summing over the caseworkers the variance of the expression Aj 
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which we now plug into the formula for  ˆ ( )
l Var Y . 
In the implementation, we ignore the regression step in the matching estimator. The justification is 
given by Abadie and Imbens (2006) showing that a nonparametric regression step after the match-
ing does remove the bias in the asymptotic distribution without affecting its variance. Although our 
estimator differs in some respects from the fixed-number-of-neighbours estimator they consider, the 
general set-up is very similar. It may be conjectured that since we use a parametric instead of a non-
parametric regression the variance is indeed reduced that would lead to conservative inference. 
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